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Basic Risk Assessment of Nuclear Power 
Plants
Atomerőművek alapvető kockázatértékelése
Nuclear power plants are classified as highly important and dangerous facilities. Therefore, in addition 
to the directives for dangerous establishments, they also have to adhere to further special criteria. 
This article investigates those essential security factors which are designed to ensure nuclear safety. 
It is very important that the operation of a nuclear power plant is covered from every professional 
aspect for the sake of nuclear safety. To demonstrate this, various risk factors will be paired with 
the operational status of the facility. This relates to the fact that the operation of the Hungarian 
nuclear facility is primarily governed by the Nuclear Safety Manual. Current legislation contains all 
those important safety precautions which are in accordance with all the highly critical systems of 
the nuclear facilities that are in operation today. It also includes international recommendations 
and their relevant points.
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Az atomerőművek kiemelten fontos és veszélyes üzemeknek minősülnek, ezért a veszélyes üzemekre 
vonatkozó szabályozókon túl, további speciális kritériumoknak kell megfelelniük. A jelen cikkben 
azokat az alapvető biztonsági faktorokat veszem vizsgálat alá, amelyek, mint jól lefektetett 
alapok hivatottak szavatolni a későbbi nukleáris biztonságot. A nukleáris biztonság érdekében 
lényeges, hogy az atomerőművek üzemeltetése minden szakmai szempontból lefedett legyen, 
ehhez a kockázati faktorok párosítását vezetem le az egyes létesítményi üzemállapotokhoz. Ehhez 
kapcsolódik, hogy a magyarországi nukleáris létesítmények működése alapvetően a Nukleáris 
Biztonsági Szabályzatokban foglaltak alapján valósul meg. A jelenleg hatályos jogszabályok 
tartalmaznak minden olyan fontos biztonságos üzemeltetésre vonatkozó feltételt, amely alapján 
ma a nukleáris létesítmények kiemelten fontos rendszerei működnek, hozzávéve a nemzetközi 
ajánlásokat és azok releváns pontjait.
1 MVM Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt., Atomix Kft. Létesítményi Tűzoltóság, e-mail: antalzmax@gmail.com, ORCID: https://
orcid.org/0000-0001-9373-3454 
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1. Introduction
Electric power has become integral part of our daily life, however, as it cannot be stored in 
high quantities, it requires continuous production. Electricity can be easily produced and can 
be used both in households and by industries in multiple ways. Furthermore, it is essential for 
both private and business use in today’s world of info-communication. In Hungary the biggest 
proportion of the produced electricity comes from the nuclear power plant (NPP), as it provides 
more than  50% of the country’s total usage of electricity. Every process that can be hazardous 
for our society and environment requires to be classified by some kind of control directives 
that are related to a safety protocol. This is because the level of hazard must refer to the safety 
policies. Therefore, the directives and the convention levels must provide guidance for the safe 
establishment and operation of technological and industrial systems and processes.2
Many research articles have previously given detailed reports that human meeting energy 
needs fundamentally determines human society. As history has proven, the innovation of energy 
sources has always come with major technological improvements. Nowadays the exhaustive 
usage of nuclear energy sources occurs by adhering to serious safety criteria, which were 
 developed following tragic accidents in the past few decades. Moving away from fossil fuels 
has become the primary objective for humanity and for environmental safety alongside with 
the exponential rise of our energy needs. This shift in attitude has been necessary because the 
world’s energy production has led to global environmental issues. The usage of nuclear energy 
regardless of previous accidents is basically clean and sustainable. Therefore, complying with 
safety criteria is crucial.3
The figure below shows the change of the usage of different energy sources with regards 
to conditional consumption of Million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe).
2 International Basic Safety Standards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 
 3, IAEA, Austria,  2014; Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, International Atomic Energy Agency, Safety Stan-
dards Series No. SSR-2/1, Austria,  2012; László Manga and Lajos Kátai-Urbán, ‘Nukleáris balesetekből levonható 
tanulságok – a tudomány állása. I. rész’, Bolyai Szemle no  4 (2016),  120–136.
3 Manga and Kátai-Urbán, ‘Nukleáris balesetekből’; Katalin Fekete, ‘Cultural Aspects of the Safety of Dangerous 
Establishments’, in Előadásgyűjtemény: “Veszélyes üzemek biztonsága  2013.” Nemzetközi Iparbiztonsági Tudományos 
Konferencia. Budapest,  2013. április  10., ed. by József Dobor (Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem,  2013), 
 158–162
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Figure  1. Change in the world primary energy demand according to the International Energy Agency.
Source: ‘IEA releases World Energy Outlook  2018’. Dieselnet.
The construction and operation of NPPs are based on such requirements which are implemented 
through multilevel safety requirements from the planning phases onwards. These ensure the 
conditions for safe operation during the development and the subsequent conduction of the 
plant. The primary aspect of the risk assessments determines how the levels of risk measure 
up to the international safety requirements in each stages of establishing NPPs. During the 
design and establishment of the new third+ generation NPPs safe operational specifications 
have occurred as in the case of already existing NPPs. These contain several new technological 
solutions, which also require regulation of configuration, construction and installation, in the 
same way as the systems and system components of the earlier NPPs. In the case of new NPPs 
we can see new technological solutions such as core catcher and hydrogen recombiner. New 
criteria had to be established for the cooling of the core catcher so that the regulation and the 
termination of chain reaction can take place in adequate circumstances. The use of hydrogen 
recombiners is a significant preventative solution in critical events to avoid hydrogen explosion 
and it is attached to important regulations. The containment now possesses both external and 
internal cladding which have different protective functions and properties. Therefore, specific 
safety requirements need to be met. The spent fuel pool is located inside the containment too, 
whose requirements were already described in the Nuclear Safety Manuals (NSM). However, 
its current form needs some modifications because it is involved in the necessary intake of the 
essential safety service water system. Due to the design of the low- and high-pressure pump 
system of the cooling systems and due to the operational principal of the steam condenser 
that operates also as the passive nitrogen pressure bag of the reserve service water system, 
there is a need for new safety rule segments to be defined.4
4 International Basic Safety Standards; Government Decree  118/2011. (VII.  11.) of Nuclear safety requirements for 
nuclear installations and related regulatory activities.
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2. Safety risks of Nuclear Power Plants
It is stated that the NPPs do not have any harmful effects under regular operation and do not 
cause environmental damage. At the same time, they are a potential source of hazard because 
in the event of multiple malfunctions they can lead to an emergency. Safe operation is the 
most important criteria of the NPPs. There is a large quantity of radioactive material in the 
nuclear reactors from which the employees of the facility need to be protected, and during an 
incidental event any kind of emission into the environment must be prevented. Large quantity 
of energy (that is, residual or remnant heat) is released even after the shutdown of a reactor, 
because the fission of the radioactive materials continues.
The operation of NPPs generates ionising radiation. With regards to other effects (such as 
vibration, electric current, heat) ionising radiation is not detectable to our senses and does not 
create direct sensations, but it may present a risk of health damage. With strict adherence to 
radiation protection and technological standards together with structured practices, the risk 
of damage to the employees’ health is reducible, additionally the deterioration of environment 
and material properties is preventable. Considering radiation safety, the main aim of the NPPs’ 
operation is to provide organisational, technical and health provisions and their implementation 
to keep radiation exposure to the employees and to the general public at a reasonably low level. 
It is important to take into consideration the social and economic circumstances, furthermore 
the exclusion of every unnecessary radiation exposure and the adherence to dosage limits.5
3. General risk aspects
The risk and safety levels of the four units of the NPP in Paks can be considered to be almost 
the same. The units have a balanced technical design, which means there is no special system 
or factor that would contribute disproportionately to the risk of the NPP. The safety of 
a nuclear power plant means that various measures have been taken to prevent radiation from 
endangering human life, the health of present and future generations, the environment and 
material goods to go above an acceptable level of risk. To hold to these principles, they must 
meet the following conditions:
• the heat generated in the reactor must always be removed;
• cooling of the cassettes must also be ensured on the offline unit;
• spent fuel must also be cooled;
• release of radioactive materials into the environment must be prevented (engineering 
barriers);
5 International Basic Safety Standards; Manga and Kátai-Urbán, ‘Nukleáris balesetekből’; Primary circuit knowledge, 
Atomerőmű Tűzoltóság, ATOMIX Kft. Tűzoltási és Kárelhárítási Szakágazat, Szakmai Ismeretek Oktatási anyag, 
ATOMIX at-me-6.2.2.-1-v2,  01. 07. 2013; Radiation Protection Regulations, „MSSZ_V20” (valid from:  01. 04. 2020.), 
MVM Paksi Atomerőmű Zrt.
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• the chain reaction has to be stopped rapidly (control and safety rods);
• cooling must also be provided during every malfunction.6
Improving security and reducing risk factors are based on the design and application of 
the principle of defence in-depth protection. It is a technical safety objective to prevent 
malfunctions with high safety. When planning, every possible malfunction must be taken into 
account within the prescribed limits and one must count with the possible consequences. 
Hence, the probability of a serious accident with a significant aftermath must be sufficiently 
low. To ensure this, the basic principle that determines the safety philosophy of an NPP is the 
application of in-depth protection. This is a multilevel set of applied technical solutions and 
measures, where the risk-reduced safety objective is achieved even if any of them is ineffective. 
As a result, the design of a nuclear installation takes into account internal faults and possible 
external influences and is adequately resilient. Internal failures occur as infrequently as 
possible, and the task is to maintain the operation of safety barriers, to protect the population 
and the environment even if the defence systems are inefficient. This means that the entire 
power plant must be designed in such a way that its resistance to internal faults and external 
influences should be as high as possible, and that internal faults occur as rarely as achievable 
Appropriate application of technical solutions shall exclude the possibility of human error as 
much as possible. A high level of construction quality must be ensured during installation, and 
efforts must be made to prevent deviations from normal operating conditions.7
Figure  2. An NPP’s basic safety barriers.
Source: Primary circuit knowledge,  8.
6 Radiation Protection Regulations.
7 International Basic Safety Standards; Safety of Nuclear Power Plants; Nukleáris Biztonsági Szabályzatok.  3/A. mel-
léklet a  118/2011. (VII.  11.) Korm. rendelethez.
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4. Operational states of nuclear establishments
The life of nuclear facilities can be explained in terms of specific operating conditions and 
operating status. In addition to normal status, we distinguish simulated, safety-relevant 
expected operational events and foreseeable disturbances. In case of a more complex 
malfunction or serious accident, the safety functions should offer appropriate procedures 
depending on the situation. This means that the requirements must be met in such a way that 
the effect of the safety functions can force the nuclear installation into a controlled or safe 
shutdown state at the end of the process. To implement the safety functions, special systems 
and components must be designed. The designed systems must be adjusted to one of the 
in-depth levels of defence, which are in consistency with the operating conditions. During 
design, the construction and organisational structures are implemented at multiple, nested 
levels of protection, providing the opportunity to correct and compensate errors before they 
lead to serious consequences. These are the design basis to which event factors are assigned 
depending on the operating status.8
Table  1. Operating status of the units of an NPP based on design basis levels.
Operating status Appellation Event frequency (f [1/year])
DB1 normal status –
DB2 expected operational events f >10-2
DB3 low frequency design failures 10-2 > f >10-4
DB4 very low frequency design failures 10-4 > f >10-5
Source: Government Decree  118/2011. (VII.  11.)
From the perspective of nuclear safety, beyond the above mentioned levels, two extended 
design basis categories of operating conditions must be defined (DBC), which are assigned to 
potentially occurring events, depending on their frequency.
• DBC1: the malfunction occurs as a complex fault, that does not trigger meltdown inside 
the active zone and the spent fuel pool;
• DBC2: major accident involving significant core meltdown.9
The implementation of basic safety functions of the nuclear reactors in relation to the operating 
conditions and in-depth protection has been based on the so-called engineering barriers. 
According to this, protection of the population and environment against radioactive materials 
is ensured by a series of leak-proof barriers in case of an accident. The first barrier is the fuel rod 
cover, which in ideal conditions prevents the release of radioactive isotopes from nuclear fission 
into the refrigerant. In case of a leakage of the rod, the release of radioactive contamination 
from the cooling fluid that would enter the refrigerant or would be activated for other reasons 
is prevented by second barrier, the wall of the primary circuit refrigeration, which is designed 
8 Government Decree  118/2011. (VII.  11.); Primary circuit knowledge.
9 Government Decree  118/2011. (VII.  11.)
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to withstand high pressure. The third engineering barrier is the wall of the hermetic annulus 
formed by the rooms containing the primary circuit’s main equipment and the localisation tower, 
whose primary task is to prevent the release of radioactive contaminants into the environment 
during maximum design failure.
All these barriers must be considered with engineering precision already in the design period 
of the NPP, as the design and construction of the related systems require the implementation of 
additional safety aspects, which will make the entire construction a well-functioning, safe unit.10
5. Highly critical systems
Important system components for nuclear safety are designed with manageable failure factors, 
for which relevant research results and accumulated experience are also used. Safety functions 
are classified into safety classes with respect to fault factors and their consequences, taking 
into account the in-depth protection and specified operating conditions. In order to separate 
the protection levels, the classification of safety procedures is associated with the in-depth 
defence stages. The safety function definitions assigned to the operating levels not only contain 
prevention and management standards, but also ensure the durability of the protection at the 
given level. The operation of multiple protection and situation management protocols has 
performed an effective protective function and operating condition that keeps the situation 
under control. With the security classification of each protection function there is a deeper 
level of defence available if any of these systems should have a malfunction. It can prevent 
danger due to the lost function, but this requires a redundant technological design of security 
from the very beginning.11
If we want to design safety functions and protection systems, all possible events must 
be identified which could affect the safety of the nuclear establishment. The defined events 
must then be incorporated into the design on the basis of their generation parameters, 
consequences and other effects, from which the functional outages, reliability characteristics 
and operating parameters of the various operating conditions can be derived. The natural effects 
of the NPP’s site and its environment shall be taken into account as well as the intentional or 
unintentional events. There can be targeted in- or off-site activities and consequences of the 
nuclear operations like malfunctions or failures of the systems.12
10 Primary circuit knowledge.
11 Safety of Nuclear Power Plant.
12 Government Decree  118/2011. (VII.  11.); Primary circuit knowledge; Balázs Bognár, Lajos Kátai-Urbán, György 
Kossa, Sándor Kozma, Béla Szakál, and Gyula Vass, Iparbiztonságtan I. – Kézikönyv az iparbiztonsági üzemeltetői 
és hatósági feladatok ellátásához (Budapest: Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem, Nemzeti Közszolgálati és Tankönyv 
Kiadó Zrt.,  2013).
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Table  2. Levels of in-depth defence for operational conditions.
Level of 
in-depth 
protection
Objectives Applicable devices Radiological  consequences
Relevant operating 
status
1. Prevention of deviations 
from normal operation 
and errors
Conservative design, with 
high quality installation 
and operation; keeping 
the main operating 
parameters within the 
prescribed limits
No off-site radiological 
impact beyond official 
limits
Normal/standard 
 operation (DB1)
2. Handling of deviations 
from normal operation 
and errors
Control and safety 
 systems; other monitoring 
methods
Expected operational 
events (DB2)
3. 3.a. Management of 
malfunctions to limit 
radioactive release and 
prevent fuel melting
Safety systems, 
operational 
troubleshooting 
instructions
None or only minimal off-
site radiological impact
Design failures (DB3-4)
3.b. Safety tools for complex 
troubleshooting, 
instructions, on-site 
accident prevention 
implementations
Complex operational 
 failures (Suspected 
 multiple failure) 
(DBC1)
4. Practical elimination of 
large or early emissions, 
management of fuel 
melting accidents to limit 
off-site emissions
Additional safety devices 
to limit fuel melting, 
accident management 
instructions, on-site 
accident prevention 
measures
Off-site radiological 
impact that may justify 
introduction of spatially 
and temporally limited 
public precautions
Major accident 
(DBC2)
5. Reducing radiological 
consequences of 
significant radioactive 
material releases
On-site and off-site 
emergency response 
procedures; intervention 
levels
Off-site radiological 
exposure that makes 
public precautions 
necessary
Extremely serious 
 accident
Source: Government Decree  118/2011. (VII.  11.),  213.
If a nuclear establishment operates more than one power plant unit or if it is located in 
the vicinity of another NPP, an analysis shall be performed that clearly shows the potential 
interactions between the facility and the units, taking all operating conditions into account, 
including all hazards. This includes analyses of the defence systems that act as security 
systems shared by multiple NPP units. In light of this, security systems and components must 
have both active and passive solutions. All operating conditions and in-depth safety levels 
are designed to provide the necessary accident handling and intervention capabilities. The 
defence functions must be activated automatically in all cases to prevent the development 
of more serious consequences.
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At the same time, it is not possible to offer the option to deactivate the protection functions 
and the intervention by an operator can only be available if the time interval between the 
detection of the occurrence and the implementation of the necessary action proves to be 
achievable. In addition, the performance of safety functions cannot be hindered by any system 
failure to operate in normal process.13
6. Nuclear safety regulations
Despite the high level of design, construction and operation, continuous inspection and 
testing, events that could lead to failure or accident (for instance, pipe breakage due to internal 
material defect, natural disaster, and so on) cannot be ruled out. Therefore, safety systems and 
troubleshooting instructions are needed to deal with the presumed situation. Safety  systems 
should be designed in such a way that the integrity of the active zone is maintained in the 
event of any predetermined malfunction. Besides this, they must also be prepared to deal with 
accidents that are very unlikely but have serious consequences.14
In such cases, safety systems no longer provide the adequate protection, and the most 
dangerous situation for reactors, the core meltdown can occur, which can lead to high level of 
radioactive release. The risk of these events should be minimised as low as reasonably achievable 
by installing systems that reduce or at least delay the rate of zone melting, leaving time for 
other critical measures (for example, eviction of population).
Achieving and maintaining a high level of safety, which also means a low level of risk, is 
therefore a fundamental aspect in the design and conduct of NPPs. These can be ensured partly 
by the appropriate design of the physical structure of the technological systems, the application 
of modern technical solutions, and partly the high-quality implementation of the operation, 
organisational structure and work coordination. Risk analyses can only be considered complete 
if the frequency of the zone damage or radioactive release is determined as a consequence of 
an initial event (technological failures, internal and external hazards such as: fire, flooding or 
earthquake) that can be assumed in all operating conditions of the plant (different phases of 
restart/shutdown and rated power output).15
13 Government Decree  118/2011. (VII.  11.); Primary circuit knowledge; Bognár et al., Iparbiztonságtan I. 
14 Safety of Nuclear Power Plants.
15 Fekete, ‘Cultural Aspects’; Lajos Kátai-Urbán, Katalin Sibalin-Fekete, and GyulaVass, ‘Hungarian Regulation on the 
Protection of Major Accidents Hazards’, Journal of Environmental Protection, safety, Education and Management 
 4, no  8 (2016),  83–86.
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Figure  3. Summary of safety policy design of nuclear facilities.
Source: made by the author.
During the examination of emissions, the completeness includes the impact assessment of 
all relevant sources of radioactive material (primarily the active zone and spent fuel pool 
heaters). For the damaging effect assessment event-logical models need to be developed, 
during which the hazards (initial events) that can lead to zone-damage or radiological release 
must be analysed first. After any initial event a process simulation shall be used to determine 
the failure and accident processes that may occur due to a downfall of the safety systems. 
During the simulation, the necessary and sufficient aspects for the successful intervention of the 
systems must be identified. System analysis should reveal failures that could hinder successful 
interventions and the logical conditions which can cause a function loss. By editing these faulty 
data, the error-specific circumstances of the event-logical model shall be summarised. This 
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should include the expected frequency of initial events, equipment failures, the likelihood of 
human error, and time intervals for each elementary operation and maintenance activity.
Taking these into consideration, the task of the NPP’s environmental protection protocol 
includes the control of the radioactive discharges of the power plant, determination of their 
size and composition, and the continuous monitoring of the natural and artificial radiation 
conditions of the environment, therefore the construction of an NPP must meet a number of 
criteria even in the planning period. The most fundamental principle is that although it can 
cause serious damage to human health, wildlife and the environment, but at the same time the 
safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy has significant advantages in many areas of scientific 
research and in improving human living conditions, and these advantages can be exploited 
with adequate safety.16
7. Summary and conclusions
The legislation and the relevant Nuclear Safety Regulations have determined the basic safety 
objectives for the design and construction of new NPPs, the reconstruction and operation of 
existing NPPs, and the design and constituents of systems that are important for nuclear safety. 
A long-term, global safety objective of the design and operation of NPPs is to ensure that the 
risk of potential accidents neither increases nor decreases with the expansion of installed nuclear 
capacity. To achieve this goal the safety of existing NPPs must be increased by appropriate 
measures, and technical solutions that meet stricter risk criteria must be applied when setting 
up and building new systems.
Worldwide, in all industrial sectors where accidents can occur and hazardous substances can 
harm people and pollute the environment, there is a chance that an unexpected and unforeseen 
event arises, even with the highest level of safety and strategy. As a result of today’s modern 
technology and innovative thinking, the number of circumstances that can cause industrial 
accidents have been minimised, although the efforts devoted to damage control and damage 
elimination have remained procedures to be improved and perfected in the first place.
Beyond these, fire prevention and protection have remained the highest priority in the life 
of an NPP, as it is not only necessary to prepare for events involving hazardous substances in 
the plant, but also to ensure nuclear safety. The multiple redundant systems built for fire safety 
need to operate not only in theory and during test but in real situations too. The point is not 
only to meet the requirements of the licensing authorities, but to create carefully and properly 
designed systems that provide protection in all circumstances and help to prevent a disaster. 
When we exchange views on an NPP, fire protection must be planned from construction to 
decommissioning. In many cases, events that endanger nuclear safety will be prevented by the 
fulfilment of fire prevention safety conditions, and if an event requiring intervention does occur, 
the established fire protection systems will intervene and eliminate the danger. Intervening 
system components, whether automatic, manual or even human intervention dependent, form 
16 International Basic Safety Standards.
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an overlapping structure, where each level can handle the threat on its own and the failure of 
any level does not cause other protection systems to collapse and become unusable. Therefore, 
by designing and constructing new NPPs and rebuilding existing ones it is very important that 
the systems and components which provide nuclear safety are outlined and implemented at 
the highest level.
In terms of safety, the volumes of the NSR contain a list of requirements for all nuclear 
facilities that guarantee safety from the first stage of design to the final point of decommissioning 
and discharge. If we look at the development of the currently operating NPP in Paks and take 
into account that another nuclear facility is being planned in the immediate vicinity of the 
establishment, it is important that policy upgrades are implemented that guarantee not only 
the applicability of new technologies, but also consider the effects of the two plants on each 
other. It is important, for example, that reactor protection measures, which must physically 
initiate the shutdown of a reactor, include transmission of information that can launch the 
defence systems in the other power plant, depending on the operating condition of the 
triggering protection function. To ensure safe operation of the new power plant, the conditions 
must be guaranteed by methods and procedures that do not affect safety systems of the older 
power plant and along this no process or failure of the new power plant can induce a domino 
effect on the old one. Furthermore, the summary of the safety policy of the currently operating 
NPP in Paks should be used to meet the specific safety requirements of the new NPP which 
will be built next to the existing plant on the same natural water source in order to meet the 
international requirements. In the case of operating NPPs, the complex application of safety 
policies has been proven to be able to intervene effectively in all currently reasonably  thought-
out and experienced situations. However, a significant number of safety systems get activated 
by some cooling water process, which have been installed on the same water source, hence the 
safety design needs to be fundamentally rethought and reorganised so that the current high 
level of safety/efficiency rate remains at least at the same level or, if possible, even increased.
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